Based on Ukraine's experience, the most significant aerial threats come from glide bombs and long-range attack drones. With existing technology and resources, Estonia could reach a defense capability comparable to Ukraine's, but we must prepare for a far greater scale of attacks than previous theories and assessments have anticipated, write Martin Herem and Riivo Piirson.

First, we must recognize that the air threat in Ukraine differs significantly from how we've generally imagined air attacks. Second, Ukraine's air defense has evolved alongside the threat. Broadly speaking, all airstrikes can be divided into four categories: (1) ballistic missiles, (2) cruise missiles, (3) long-range attack drones (Geran, Gerber, Shahed) and (4) glide bombs (simplified as KABs).

Excluding glide bombs, attacks using aircraft or helicopters are rare. An estimated 20 percent of ballistic missile (Iskander-M) and 95 percent of glide bomb strikes rely on unmanned reconnaissance drones, which have essentially become as important targets as long-range attack drones or cruise missiles.

KABs are typically dropped from aircraft about 60 kilometers from the target, remaining ten or more kilometers from the front line — relatively safe territory within their own airspace.

In 2025, a total of 44,782 bombs were dropped — an average of 123 per day — carried out via approximately 26,000 sorties using Sukhoi-type aircraft. Air defense systems managed to intercept only 22 of them. The primary targets are military, including civilian infrastructure. Fewer strikes are aimed at military support structures (command centers, supplies).

It's worth noting that KABs accounted for 44 percent of all four categories of airstrikes. Their small size (about 3 meters by 0.5 meters), high speed (600–1,000 km/h) and minimal heat signature make them essentially untouchable by conventional air defense weapons.